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Financialization and the Decline of Organized Labor: 





Is financialization contributing to the slow decline of union density that is occurring 
across most advanced capitalist countries? Combining insights from literatures on 
financialization, corporate governance, and comparative political economy, we argue 
that the growing dominance of finance within advanced capitalism weakens trade 
unions through several channels, and plays an important but underappreciated role in 
the deunionization of national workforces. Using data from 18 advanced capitalist 
countries over several decades, this assertion is tested against the literature’s existing 
explanations for declining union density. Results from panel regression models suggest 
that financialization is an important cause of union decline, but that its particular effects 
vary between different types of advanced capitalism. The study concludes by arguing 
that financialization creates new interconnections between firms and finance capital, 
resulting in business practices that ultimately put downward pressure on union 
densities across advanced capitalist countries.   
  
 4 
Financialization and the Decline of Organized Labor: 




 This study examines financialization’s role in the continuing erosion of union 
density occurring in most advanced capitalist countries over recent decades. Because 
the implications of union decline are far-reaching and profound, a large literature 
examines the causes of this phenomenon. Extant explanations center on the 
decentralization of collective bargaining and the waning success of left-labor parties 
(Baccaro and Howell 2011, 2017; Brady 2007; Western 1995, 1997). Other explanations 
emphasize the decline of industrial employment (Kollmeyer 2018; Lee 2005), the 
weakening of class solidarity due to immigration (Lee 2005), and the shrinking of the 
public-sector economy (Scruggs and Lange 2002). Similarly, certain labor market 
institutions, such as the Ghent system, clearly help unions attract and sustain members 
(Brady 2007; Sano and Williamson 2008; Scruggs and Lange 2002; Western 1997). But 
debates persist over whether globalization and the concomitant surge in trade expose 
organized labor to outsourcing and debilitating wage competition, or whether resulting 
economic growth and new employment opportunities counter these forces (cf. Brady 
2007; Scruggs and Lange 2002; O’Farrell 2010).  
 Building on literatures that address financialization and corporate governance, 
we seek to move debates on union decline in a new direction. In general, we contend 
that the growing dominance of finance weakens and liberalizes core labor market 
institutions such as unions. This occurs because financialization forges new links 
between firms and their financial stakeholders, ultimately leading to management 
strategies that emphasize the reduction of labor costs and the distribution of cost-
savings back to financial stakeholders. This represents a significant change from the 
post-war business models, in which firms sought a more judicious balance between the 
pecuniary interests of capital and labor. Additionally, finance is becoming more central 
to the operations of non-financial corporations, driving a process of “rent-seeking” 
whereby firms and financial institutions improve their economic positions by shifting 
income and resources away from workers and other stakeholders (Durand 2017; 
Lapavitsas 2014; Roberts and Kwon 2017; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). In the 
present study, we extend these ideas, arguing that financialization also drives a long-
term process of labor-market and corporate restructuring, which in turn fundamentally 
 5 
weakens union power and reduces union membership. In this way, we link the rise of 
finance-fuelled capitalism to the ongoing deunionization of national workforces. 
 Despite the clear plausibility that financialization lowers union density, 
studies that systematically assess this possibility are limited (Darcillon 2015; Meyer 
Forthcoming). We note that some comparative studies consider financial openness 
within the context of globalization (Lee 2005; Scruggs and Lange 2002; Vachon, Wallace, 
and Hyde 2016), and that some case studies consider financialization’s impact on 
organized labor within individual countries (Batt and Appelbaum 2014; Gospel, 
Pendleton, and Vitols 2013). Yet comprehensive panel studies exploring financialization 
and its effect on union density are lacking. To fill this gap in the literature, we use panel 
data from 18 advanced capitalist countries over recent decades to test our 
financialization hypothesis against the literature’s primary explanations for union 
decline. We measure financialization across four domains—capital market intensity, 
inward portfolio flows, financial sector size, and corporate indebtedness—and consider 
potential moderating factors linked to differences between liberal and coordinated 
forms of advanced capitalism. We also consider the possibility of endogeneity bias 
arising from reverse causation. Our regression results show that financialization is 
negatively linked to union density across our sample, but that the specific dynamics vary 
between liberal and coordinated forms of capitalism. We conclude by arguing that 
financialization plays an important role in the deunionization of national workforces 
and constitutes another major factor in the shifting balance of power between capital 
and labor.  
 
FINANCIALIZATION AND UNION DECLINE  
  The following section outlines four causal mechanisms linking financialization 
to union decline. We pay particular attention to how specific aspects of financialization 
affect firm ownership, control, and business operations. Building on critical literatures, 
we argue that financialization fundamentally transforms the relationship between 
financial markets and non-financial corporations (Durand 2017; Duménil and Lévy 
2011; Forhoohar 2016; Krippner 2011; Lapavitsas 2014), and that through a number of 
overlapping and reinforcing channels, finance reshapes labor relations and economic 
activities in ways that reduce unionized employment. These general effects, however, 
are partially shaped and deflected by institutional differences characterizing different 
forms of advanced capitalism. Our general expectation is that financialization puts 
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downward pressure on unionization across advanced capitalism, but that the specific 
ways in which this occurs vary between liberal and coordinated forms of capitalism.  
 
Capital Markets and the “Shareholder Model” of Business  
 The growing scope of capital markets and the associated rise of the “shareholder 
model” of corporate governance represent a first key link between financialization and 
union decline (Cobb 2016; Gospel and Pendleton 2005; Fligstein 2001; Jacoby 2008;  
Lazonick 2011b). In contrast to frameworks that emphasize distinct “varieties of 
capitalism” and differences between “patient” and “market-based” financing, recent 
literature emphasizes more universal ways that investors can exert pressure on firms 
to reshape corporate governance and business operations (Batt and Appelbaum 2014; 
Lapavitsas 2014; Durand 2017). Previously, corporations were typically held by 
wealthy families and dispersed shareholders operating at the national level. Now, 
corporations are mainly held by financial firms and institutional investors, such as 
mutual funds, pension funds, exchange-traded funds, and investment management 
corporations (Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-Bernardo 2017; Huizinga and Jonung 
2005; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000). For instance, institutional investors now own 
approximately 75 percent of the largest publicly traded corporations in the United 
States, more than 54 percent of those in Western Europe (Celik and Isaksson 2014; 
Observatoire de l'Epargne Europeene and Services 2013), and more than 80 percent in 
Europe’s largest economy—Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014).  
 Change in firm ownership brought about by financialization may not necessarily 
change actual corporate governance, but it can result in the overhaul of corporate 
operations and the liberalization of employment relations (Crotty 2005; Davis 2016; 
Durand 2017; Forhoohar 2016). In contrast to standard business practices of the mid-
twentieth century, today’s financialized firms characteristically operate under a 
“shareholder model” of corporate governance, in which firms focus more narrowly on 
returns to investors and often use their resources to purchase financial assets rather 
than to invest in normal business operations (Batt and Appelbaum 2013; Fligstein 2001; 
Lapavitsas 2014; Lazonick 2011a; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Furthermore, affected 
firms use shorter time frames to evaluate business investment decisions, making them 
more likely to undertake corporate restructuring and shed workers in the effort to 
lower costs, boost profits, and increase share prices (Crotty 2005; Davis 2009; Lin 2016; 
Orhangazi 2008). But, in general, finance derives its profits from rents taken from 
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productive activities and this often entails shifting corporate operations toward 
financial channels and away from physical investment and payrolls (Durand 2017; Lin 
and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013).  
 Importantly, this business model is linked with the emergence of aggressive 
human relations strategies (Cushen and Thompson 2016; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 
2000; Thompson 2013). Here the general argument is that finance capital increasingly 
compels non-financial firms to adopt human resource strategies that emphasize labor 
costs reduction as a means of bolstering income available for shareholders. The 
implementation of this strategy, some scholars contend, drove waves of corporate 
downsizing and outsourcing (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Jung 2014; 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Lin 2016) and heightened the use of part-time and 
temporary employees (Murphy and Turner 2014; Slaughter 2007). It also prompted 
firms to push for employer-friendly forms of collective bargaining and watered-down 
employment protections (Cobb 2016; Darcillon 2015), and sometimes reduced 
unionized employment in particular (Fligstein and Shin 2007). However, as Jackson, 
Höpner, and Kurdelbusch (2006) and Barker (2010) argue, the introduction of a 
shareholder model in Germany – a country with extensive corporate and unionized 
workforce coordination – has not been wholly negative. Here profit-sharing between 
shareholders and unionized labor purportedly increases the attractiveness of 
unionization for some workers, although this may precipitate rising income inequality 
and falling wage shares (Detzer and Hein 2017).  
 In our empirical analysis, we use stock market capitalization and trading 
volumes as proxies for the financialization of capital markets and the emergence of 
shareholder models of corporate governance. Market capitalization and trading 
volumes are reasonable indicators of the extent to which publicly traded firms face 
pressures to orient their business practices around efforts to increase returns to 
shareholders (Barker 2010; Meyer Forthcoming). For the countries in our sample, 
market capitalization increased more than four-fold (from 18 to 83 percent of GDP) and 
trading volume by 15-fold (from four to 60 percent of GDP) over the years examined in 
our study (World Bank 2016a). We hypothesize that publicly traded firms, as they 
become more beholden to powerful equity investors, must restructure labor relations 
in ways that reduce headcounts and eliminate higher-cost unionized labor. We also test 
whether this effect varies across different types of capitalism, as suggested by Jackson, 
Höpner, and Kurdelbusch (2006). 
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 Financial Deregulation and Capital Mobility  
  A related linkage is the deregulation of finance and the rise of globally oriented 
investors. We note that changes to corporate ownership and governance coincided with 
the deregulation and global integration of financial systems in many advanced capitalist 
countries. During the post-war era, the international financial system limited cross-
border capital flows to foreign direct investments, with the intent of bolstering 
economic stability and national policy autonomy (Jacoby 2008; Helleiner 1995). 
However, economic problems in the 1970s prompted a rollback of regulatory 
constraints and a push toward financial sector deregulation more generally. Some states 
pursued financial sector liberalization and global integration not as a means of 
providing liquidity to the “real economy,” but as an engine of economic growth in its 
own right (Crotty 2005; Durand 2017; Helleiner 1995; Lapavitsas 2014). Crucially, 
states also propelled this aspect of financialization via attempts to address rising public 
debt and growing current account deficits and – in Europe – through the creation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Streeck 2014). Overall, the visible hand of 
government drove numerous regulatory changes, such as abandoning capital controls 
on foreign exchange and derivatives trading; loosening restrictions on the international 
buying and selling of domestic equity; lowering bank liquidity ratios; legalizing hedge 
funds; and reforming pension funds and stock market legislation to boost new equity 
investment (Guttman 2016; Peters 2011).  
 Consequently, financial firms and institutional investors now enjoy significant 
freedom to operate outside of their national borders. Clearly, this is an important 
feature of globalization, but we believe it also characterizes financialization, because 
without the free movement of capital, financial development would be severely 
hampered and the options available to equity investors severely limited. Indeed, 
reflecting these changes, inward flows of portfolio investment increased across our 
sample of 18 countries from a meager two percent of GDP in the early 1970s to a 
massive 75 percent of GDP by 2012 (World Bank 2016a).  
Importantly, we contend that through this second channel of financialization 
globally oriented finance has sought to overturn long-established business practices, 
including those that help to sustain organized labor. For example, institutional investors 
can take assertive roles in their search for short-term profits and capital gains, 
jettisoning old managerial teams and corporate boards and launching restructuring 
 9 
initiatives that create immediate value for shareholders (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; 
Batt and Appelbaum 2014). Furthermore, globally oriented finance can push for new 
strategic initiatives, such as undertaking mergers and acquisitions and creating global 
supply chains (Coe and Wai-Chung Yeung 2015; Milberg and Winkler 2013). Both 
activities may result in layoffs and the shedding of unionized workers in particular 
(Durand 2017; Morgan 2014).  
Clearly, there are limits to finance’s ability to force corporate change (Bulfone 
2017; Maxfield, Winecoff, and Young 2017), but we believe that the liberalization and 
globalization of finance increases the degree to which non-financial firms must heed the 
interests of globally oriented investors. To explore this idea empirically, we examine the 
magnitude of inward portfolio flows and the liberalization of legal restrictions on capital 
mobility. We hypothesize that these factors put downward pressure on union density. 
 
Financial Sector Growth and the Reallocation of Labor  
 Third, we consider the growing use of financial activities by non-financial firms 
and how this may affect employment relations and opportunities for unionized 
employment. In contrast to older models of corporate operations, where firms pursued 
profits by expanding and improving their core lines of business, financial models of 
business encourage executives to view their firms as an assemblage of assets whose 
returns can be maximized through various strategies, including mergers, acquisitions, 
divestitures, and downsizing (Batt and Appelbaum 2013; Lapavitsas 2014). This leads 
non-financial firms to heighten their engagement in financial activities—such as 
derivative trading, leasing, and lending—and to increase their holdings in financial 
assets (Krippner 2011; Orhangazi 2008).  
 Importantly, under this business model, the management of financial assets can 
supplant traditional corporate activities that support unionized employment (Cobb 
2016; Duménil and Lévy 2011; Durand 2017). In the United States and Canada, 
corporations have increased their holdings of financial assets relative to productive 
assets, and in many cases the income generated from financial holdings has increased 
significantly (Brennan 2014; Krippner 2011). Similarly, in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France, financial payments made by non-financial firms have grown while 
fixed capital formation has declined, creating a situation in which finance “crowds out” 
physical investment and potentially undermines opportunities for unionized 
employment (Durand 2017; Orhangazi 2008). Furthermore, firms use financial services 
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not just to facilitate their normal business operations, but to buy back stock and invest 
in other financial assets (Milberg and Winkler 2013), causing the financial sector to 
expand. 
 We emphasize that these business strategies begin to unhinge corporate 
profitability from unionized types of employment. In general, this amounts to firms 
substituting financial activities for the production of tangible goods and services—an 
outcome that should increase employment in the financial sector but decrease 
employment in non-financial sectors. Such trends were particularly noticeable in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, when many firms invested cash holdings in financial 
assets rather than core operations (Baker 2017; Detzer and Hein 2014; Stanford 2011). 
Given that workers overseeing financial activities are rarely unionized, we hypothesize 
that growth in the financial sector is associated with declining union density.  
 
Corporate Debt and Workforce Reduction 
 Growing corporate indebtedness is a fourth linkage between financialization 
and the deunionization of workplaces. Over recent decades, corporate debt has nearly 
doubled, growing to 72 percent of GDP across major advanced capitalist countries 
(Dobbs et al. 2015). Such trends reflect new and profitable uses of debt by non-financial 
firms. For example, corporations may borrow funds not only to expand normal business 
operations, but to pursue highly financialized activities—such as mergers and 
acquisitions and stock buybacks (Crotty 2005; Peters 2011). In turn, these financialized 
activities can heighten share prices, creating immediate capital gains for shareholders, 
but they may have negative effects on employment relations. Similarly, private equity 
partnerships often use debt to purchase firms, which they then “restructure” in ways 
that free cash for future debt repayments (Batt and Appelbaum 2014). Again, such 
outcomes put unionized jobs at risk (Lin 2016).  
 Even less speculative uses of debt may undermine union density. Scholarship 
highlights links between indebtedness and the strategic decisions of firms (Davis 2016). 
Because firms make investment and hiring decisions based on projections of future 
revenue and debts, increased debt can have negative implications for employment 
relations and labor-cost management (Jung and Dobbin 2014). This happens partly 
because debt obligations, unlike equity, have fixed repayment schedules, which firms 
must meet regardless of their performance. Additionally, since creditors take 
precedence over equity investors in terms of making claims on firms’ financial 
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resources, even relatively low levels of debt can spark conflicts between debt holders 
and firm managers over business and employment strategies. Case studies of corporate 
downsizing find correlations between debt levels and employee layoffs (Gittell et al. 
2006; Hillier et al. 2007). Similar studies link highly leveraged firms with the adoption 
of aggressive stances toward concessionary wage bargaining and unions in general 
(Batt and Appelbaum 2014; Lin 2016).  
 As suggested above, the negative implications of corporate indebtedness for 
employment relations are well known on an individual case basis, but systematic panel 
studies of this topic are limited. To investigate this matter, we examine credit extended 
to non-financial firms as a proxy for general levels of corporate indebtedness. For our 
sample of countries, credit extended to non-financial firms increased nearly threefold 
over recent decades—rising from 54 percent of GDP in 1975 to 152 percent of GDP by 
2012 (OECD 2015b; Ferreiro and Gomez 2016). We expect to find links between this 
surge in indebtedness and declining union membership.  
 
Financialization and Forms of Capitalism   
 In the context of our study, theories from comparative political economy 
anticipate that the effects of financialization on unionized employment may vary across 
our sample. In particular, the “varieties of capitalism” perspective identifies liberal 
market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) as the principal 
types of advanced capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2014). Institutional 
differences between these types of capitalism are held to be systematic and enduring 
due to the path-dependent nature of capitalist development. In LMEs, firms interact 
with each other and their employees through arms-length transactions on competitive 
markets, with outcomes being dictated by prevailing market forces. Equity investors 
often seek immediate returns and may exert significant influence over firm strategy. In 
such countries, the negative effects of financialization described above are quite 
plausible.  
 By contrast, CMEs are characterized by institutions and business practices that 
alter the ways market forces affect firm behavior (Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Barker 
2010; Bulfone 2017). For our study, we note that unions typically enjoy representation 
on corporate boards (helping them shape business strategy) and usually engage in 
policy concertation and centralized wage bargaining (helping them shape national 
economic policy and sectoral wage rates, respectively). These institutionalized 
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practices should enable unions to mitigate the worst effects of financialization. 
Furthermore, corporate governance offers some protection for long-term strategic 
shareholders, and most firms have substantial blockholders and engage in cross-
shareholding with strategically aligned firms. These corporate practices may buffer 
firms from the immediate demands of portfolio investors by providing them with 
alternative interests when considering how to respond to market and takeover 
pressures. Overall, these institutions and business practices should limit the ability of 
finance capital to restructure employment relations to their advantage (see Jackson, 
Höpner, and Kurdelbusch 2006). 
Toward the end of our study, we examine whether financialization’s effect on 
union density varies between LMEs and CMEs. Our expectation is that financialization 
puts downward pressure on union density across our sample, but that the specific 
channels through which this occurs may vary between types of advanced capitalism. In 
particular, we expect that the financialization of capital markets decisively shapes 
unionized employment in LMEs, but that financial sector expansion may be more 
important in CMEs due to its rapid enlargement across the EU in the 1990s and 
continued growth in the 2000s.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample  
 To test our arguments about financialization’s negative effect on organized 
labor, we collect annual observations on union membership, financialization, and 
numerous control variables for 18 advanced capitalist countries from 1970 to 2012. The 
18 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Combining the cross-sectional 
and temporal dimensions of the data yield 774 observations per variable (t = 43 × n = 
18), but missing data and first differencing reduce the number of complete observations 
to 719 for our baseline model. Some financialization variables begin after 1975, further 





 Our dependent variable is the percentage of wage and salary earners belonging 
to unions. This measure includes both private and public sector workers, but excludes 
union members who are self-employed, retired, unemployed, or otherwise outside the 
workforce. The data for this widely used measure of union density comes from Visser 
(2015). We consider using data on private sector unionism, but these data are 
significantly limited for the countries and years comprising our sample.1   
 We measure financialization with four variables, which together capture the 
size, structure, and activities of the financial sector and the different channels through 
which financialization can reshape firms and labour markets. Our first variable, stock 
market index, gauges financialization of domestic capital markets. It combines “stock 
market capitalization” (market value of outstanding shares listed on domestic 
exchanges per GDP) and “stock trading activity” (market value of stocks sold on 
domestic exchanges per GDP). Higher market capitalization should increase pressure 
on firms to generate returns for shareholders, and higher trading activity should 
correspond to a more active shareholder model of governance. Both outcomes, we 
contend, heighten pressure on firms to restructure their labor relations systems in ways 
that benefit external investors. We combine these two measures into an index by 
converting them to z-scores, summing them, and dividing by two. Data are developed 
by World Federation of Exchanges and made available by the World Bank (2016a). 
Unfortunately, the first observations begin in 1975 for most countries and not until the 
mid-1980s for others (specifically, Finland, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, and 
Switzerland).  
 Next, inward portfolio index is a composite variable combining de facto and de 
jure measures of foreign portfolio investment (FPI). Although FPI is associated with 
globalization, we contend that a thorough understanding of financialization must 
consider foreign capital flows. Unlike foreign direct investment (FDI), which entails the 
direct ownership and management of foreign businesses or subsidiaries, FPI are 
financial assets that can be readily bought and sold on stock markets. This gives them 
shorter investment timeframes, which we suspect intensifies pressure on firms to 
restructure their employment relations in order to achieve short-term profitability 
targets (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Lazonick 2011a). Our de facto measure of FPI 
gauges the market value of all inward portfolio investment as a percentage of GDP. Data 
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come from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017). Our de jure measure captures the 
liberalization of regulatory constraints on cross-border capital flows. Data come from 
Chinn and Ito (2016), who use the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions to estimate capital account 
liberalization. Again, to create an index variable, we combine both measures by 
converting them to z-scores, summing them, and dividing by two.  
 We use composite variables for several reasons. First, they help us assess 
financialization as a more general phenomenon since they aggregate underlying details. 
Additionally, they often yield greater reliability than individual indicators, especially 
when the phenomenon under consideration is multifaceted. Third, our stock market 
index is very similar to the measure of financialization used by Meyer (Forthcoming). 
Finally, our substantive results are unaffected by this decision, so the parsimony of 
index variables is preferable. However, for readers wishing to see the underlying detail, 
we re-run our models after disaggregating our index variables and show the result in 
Table A1 of the appendix.    
 Our third financialization variable, financial sector size, gauges the overall scope 
and development of a country’s financial sector. Specifically, it equals value added in 
finance and insurance as a percentage of value added across the entire economy. 
Following critical political economy literatures, we expect that financial sector 
expansion reflects deregulation and the ability of financial markets to appropriate 
resources away from other parts of the economy and subsequently expand labour 
markets into areas with lower union and employment protection (Durand 2017; 
Lapavitsas 2014). Data come from Godechot (2016), who creates the series using the 
OECD STAN database, version 3, and the EU KLEMS database, version 3. This variable 
begins in 1970 for all countries, except Switzerland where it begins in 1990.  
 Lastly, corporate indebtedness measures the book value of outstanding debt held 
by non-financial corporations as a percentage of GDP. Data come from the Bank of 
International Settlements (2017). This measure reflects “core debt,” which includes 
loans, debt securities, and similar debt obligations, but excludes liabilities arising from 
accounts payable, financial derivatives, pensions, and employee stock options. 
Unfortunately, data are missing from the 1970s for Belgium and France and from the 
1970s and 1980s from Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland. We 
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consider other measures of indebtedness (e.g. World Bank 2016a), but these include 
household debt, making them inapplicable to our study. 
  
Control Variables 
 Our regression models control for 10 known covariates of union density. Here 
we aim not to account for all possible determinants of union density, but instead to 
reduce the chance of model misspecification arising from the omission of important 
control variables. Our selection of control variables is guided by prominent comparative 
studies of union density in advanced capitalist countries (Checchi and Visser 2005; Lee 
2005; Sano and Williamson 2008; Scruggs and Lange 2002; Vachon, Wallace, and Hyde 
2016).  
Our baseline model starts with structural economic factors thought to affect 
union density. First, we control for public sector size, partly because our union density 
variable includes public sector workers, but also because the public sector varies 
considerably across our sample. Given the lack of suitable panel data on public sector 
workforces, we use the public sector’s contribution to national economic output as a 
proxy. It measures the value of all goods and services produced by government (at all 
levels), but excludes cash transfers for social welfare payments and debt repayments. 
Figures are expressed as a percentage of GDP. Second, we control for trade openness—
the value of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP—because exposure to global 
markets in tradable goods may impede unionization. Data for both variables come from 
the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015).2 Third, we control for 
industrial employment, because the industrial sector is highly unionized but shrinking 
in most countries. This measure equals the percentage of the national workforce 
employed in the industrial sector, with the industrial sector including manufacturing, 
mining, construction, oil and gas extraction, and similar activities. Data come from OECD 
(2015a). 
 We also control for various political forces and labor market institutions. 
Cumulative left cabinet seats measures the long-term presence of labor-friendly 
governments. It equals the share of cabinet seats held by left parties expressed as a 
cumulative score from 1960 onwards. Note that the Liberals in Canada and the 
Democrats in the United States are coded as centrist not left. Data come from the 
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Comparative Politics Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2017). Centralized wage bargaining 
captures the level of wage bargaining and the degree of coordination and control within 
organized labor itself. Higher scores reflect more centralization and more control. Data 
come from Visser (2015). Ghent is a dummy variable coded “1” for countries where 
unions administer publically subsided unemployment benefits on behalf of their 
members. This creates strong incentives for workers to join unions. Ghent countries are 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.  
 We include unemployment and inflation as similar but independent indictors of 
the business cycle. Data come from OECD (OECD 2015b). Our general expectation is that 
rising insecurity brought about by macroeconomic problems heightens incentives for 
workers to join unions, but Checchi and Visser (2005) argue the situation can be more 
complex. Specifically, they note that unemployment creates some downward pressure 
on union density by shifting the balance of class power away from workers, thereby 
making unionization more difficult, and by pushing some union members out of the 
workforce altogether. However, these effects are weakened in Ghent countries by the 
structural link between union membership and unemployment benefits. Also, for 
inflation, they note that the free rider problem lessens the appeal of unions as a means 
of protecting real wages, especially when bargaining agreements cover unionized and 
non-unionized workers alike. Hence, the overall theoretical expectations regarding the 
business cycle are ambiguous, except for the idea that unemployment’s effect on union 
density should vary between Ghent and non-Ghent countries.  
  Our variable net immigration controls for the possibility that migrant workers 
may impede unionization, in part by weakening class solidarity (see Lee 2005). Since 
panel data are limited, we follow Lee (2005) and measure net immigration indirectly by 
subtracting a country’s natural population change (arising from births and deaths) from 
its overall population change, with the difference attributed to net immigration. Figures 
are expressed as cumulative scores, so they reflect the stock of migrants within the 
general population. Data for the calculations come from the World Bank (2016b).  
 Lastly, we account for historic levels of union strength. This is motivated by 
Western’s (1995) finding that deunionization occurs sooner and more rapidly in 
countries where union participation is historically weak (see also Sano and Williamson 
2008). Using Visser (2015) data, we measure historic union density as a 10-year lag of 
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contemporaneous union density. The long lag-period is possible because Visser’s data 
start in 1960. We expect this variable to be positively signed, indicating that countries 
with high union densities in the past experience less union decline in the present.   
 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY  
First-Difference Regression  
 Using the data and variables described above, we use first-difference regression 
analysis to model change in union density as a function of change in four financialization 
variables and 10 control variables. Shown in simple bivariate form in equation (1), our 
models use Prais-Winsten estimation procedures and panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) to account for serial correlation, contemporaneous correlation, and 
heteroscedasticity.  
     ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑏𝑏1(∆𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + ∆𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
 This modelling strategy deals with several complications associated with panel 
data. One complication is the likelihood of unobserved heterogeneity (Halaby 2004; 
Wooldridge 2012, chap. 14). Standard regression techniques assume that the sample’s 
observations are independent, but observations comprising panel data are structurally 
linked. While panel data allows us to model union density under different market 
conditions and institutional contexts, it likely introduces unmeasured heterogeneity 
into our models. If these unmeasured effects are correlated with one or more of the 
independent variables, standard regression techniques will yield biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates. We address this issue by first differencing—i.e. 
putting each variable into change-score format. This eliminates unmeasured country-
specific effects and makes our estimation strategy consistent with other studies of union 
density (Lee 2005; Scruggs and Lange 2002). 
 Importantly, unlike other panel regression techniques, first differencing 
addresses the issue of “spurious regression” (De Boef and Keele 2008; Wooldridge 2012, 
chap. 11 and 18). Especially for data with a long time-series such as ours, annual 
observations can trend over time rather than vary randomly. This creates the potential 
for “spurious regression,” an outcome in which statistically significant findings reflect 
shared time trends among variables rather than underlying causal relationships. We 
note that union density in our sample generally trends downward. This may reflect 
common trends not captured in our model, such as a growing disinclination of people 
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to join civil society organizations such as unions (Kollmeyer 2013; Checchi and Visser 
2005) or the tendency for market-constraining institutions such as collective 
bargaining to become liberalized over time (Baccaro and Howell 2011, 2017; Streeck 
2009). Given that our financialization variables generally trend upwards, regression 
analysis conducted in levels instead of first differences may yield spurious results for 
our study. Indeed, Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root tests suggest that most of our variables—
including our union density variable and all of our financialization variables—are non-
stationary when measured in levels, but stationary when measured in first differences.3   
 Our models also account for non-i.i.d. errors (Beck and Katz 1995; Plumper, 
Troeger, and Manow 2005; Wooldridge 2012, chap. 12). Estimation by ordinary least 
squares assumes the model’s errors are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), 
but models using panel data often violate this assumption even after first differencing. 
Motivated by these concerns, we test whether our model violates these assumptions. 
Results from post-estimation tests suggest the presence of non-i.i.d. errors.4 
Consequently, we use Prais-Winsten regression to account for serial correlation (in the 
form of panel-specific AR(1)) and panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to correct for 
contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity. The models are estimated with 
Stata 14.2.5     
 
Reverse Causation 
 We address the possibility of endogeneity bias arising from reverse causation 
(Halaby 2004, 532-535; Wooldridge 2012, chap. 16). Of particular concern is the 
possibility that rising stock market capitalization not only contributes to 
deunionization, as we argue, but may reflect it as well. In other words, stock market 
capitalization may increase due to higher corporate profits brought about by weakened 
unions. Similarly, falling union densities may attract inward portfolio investment. If bi-
directional patterns of causation are present but not addressed, our regression results 
could overestimate the effect of financialization on union decline.  
Unfortunately, dealing with reverse causation is difficult. The best approach 
entails the use of instrumental variable (IV) regression, but this requires the 
identification of suitable instrument variables, which for our study must be 
uncorrelated with union density but correlated with stock market capitalization or 
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inward portfolio investment. We consult the literature on the determinants of stock 
market capitalization, especially Garcia and Liu (1999), but fail to find a suitable 
instrument.6 Another approach, generalized method of moments (GMM), allows for 
endogenous covariates, but requires panel data with relatively short temporal 
dimensions. Since GMM uses lagged levels as instruments for the first-differenced 
variables, the number of instruments rises rapidly as the temporal periods increase, 
creating severe over-identification problems for temporally dominant samples such as 
ours (Roodman 2009). Following Roodman (2006), we experiment with various 
techniques, but make little progress.7 
To deal with these issues, we adopt the more limited approach used by Checchi 
and Visser (2005, 5) in their analysis of union density.  This approach entails lagging the 
suspected endogenous independent variables by one year.  The logic of this approach is 
sound—that this year’s dependent variable cannot influence last year’s independent 
variable—but its utility is debateable (see Bellemare, Masaki and Pepinsky 2017). Given 
our lack of suitable instruments and the inapplicability of GMM to our data, we use this 
more limited approach by lagging our stock market index and portfolio index variables 
by one year. We do not lag the other financialization variables, because reverse 
causation is unlikely. For instance, we know of no evidence suggesting that union 
decline spurs corporate indebtedness. 
  Nonetheless, despite a clear solution to the possibility of reverse causation, we 
are confident that our results do not merely reflect endogeneity bias. Foremost, since 
our stock market index variable includes a measure of trading activity, and since union 
decline is unlikely to cause trading volumes to rise, our measure of capital market 
financialization provides some assurance against reverse causation. In fact, we 
demonstrate this by re-running our analysis using trading activity as the lone proxy for 
capital market financialization (see Table A1 of the appendix). The results are 
statistically significant and show that trading activity is negatively related to union 
density. This suggests that our findings reflect more than reverse causation.  
 
Alternative Estimation Strategy 
 As a robustness check, we re-estimate our parameters with an error correction 
model (ECM). This technique is increasingly popular in the social sciences (De Boef and 
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Keele 2008), albeit disagreement exists over its suitability beyond conditions of strict 
cointergation (Grant and Lebo 2016). In using an ECM, we follow other studies of union 
density (see Checchi and Visser 2005; Vachon, Wallace, and Hyde 2016). To account for 
the panel structure of our data, we adapt the standard ECM specification by including 
country dummy variables (controlling for unmeasured fixed effects) and panel-
clustered robust standard errors (controlling for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity).The results from this alternative estimation strategy broadly 
support our substantive conclusions (see Table A2 in the appendix).  
 
RESULTS  
 We begin our analysis with a set of bivariate models (Table 1) and then 
introduce a set of multivariate models, which include the full battery of control variables 
(Table 2).  Organizing our analysis in this manner allows us to make maximum use of 
our data (via the bivariate models), and to gain more a varied empirical perspective on 
our subject matter (by comparing the bivariate and multivariate models). For all 
models, the independent variables are converted to z-scores to facilitate comparison. 
As shown below, both sets of models yield similar results.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Model 1 assesses the bivariate relationship between our stock market index and 
union density. This index variable, which measures market capitalization and trading 
volumes, rose across our sample, especially from the mid-1990s onwards, but 
important cross-national differences are evident. In particular, the United Kingdom and 
the United States exhibited steady and prominent growth in the stock market index from 
the 1980s onward, but countries such as Austria, Germany, and Italy experienced more 
modest growth. We argue that firms embedded in expanding capital markets must pay 
particular attention to their share price as the ultimate arbitrator of their success. Quite 
conceivably, the resulting focus on “shareholder value” prods firms to take more 
adversarial positions toward organized labor, causing union density to drop. 
Importantly, results from Model 1 are consistent with this argument, as the parameter 
estimate for stock market index is negative and statistically significant.    
Next, Model 2 examines the effect of inward portfolio investment on union 
density. Recall that during the post-war era most countries maintained strict controls 
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over cross-border portfolio investment, but in the late-1970s and early 1980s most 
countries began liberalizing these controls. In effected countries, this resulted in rising 
inflows of portfolio investment, which we suspect not only created new sources of 
financing for domestic firms, but also compelled many firms to redouble efforts to boost 
returns for foreign investors. In turn, this called into question longstanding social norms 
governing employment relations, ultimately creating a less hospitable environment for 
organized labor. Results from Model 2 are consistent with this argument as they show 
a negative and statistically significant association between inward portfolio index and 
union density.     
We consider two other measures of financialization. First, Model 3 examines 
growth in the financial sector as a whole. Our expectation is that financial sector 
expansion leads firms to redirect economic resources away from uses that traditionally 
support unionized employment. However, Model 3 provides only limited support for 
this view, as the parameter estimate for financial sector size is negative but just 
statistically significant. Next, Model 4 examines links between corporate indebtedness 
and union decline. Contrary to our expectations, we find little evidence that rising 
corporate debt influences labor relations, as the parameter estimate for corporate 
indebtedness is small and statistically insignificant by a wide margin. This may reflect 
the ability of firms to use debt in selective ways, with only some ways reducing 
unionized employment, but other factors may be at play as well. We discuss this issue 
in the conclusion. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Table 2 introduces our baseline model and proceeds in a stepwise fashion to 
examine how change in four measures of financialization affect change in union density. 
As expected, the results from the baseline model indicate that a broad range of market 
and institutional forces are important determinants of union density (Model 5). Notably, 
all of our parameter estimates exhibit the expected signs and most are statistically 
significant. In particular, the baseline model confirms that public sector size, industrial 
employment, left-labor governments, centralized wage bargaining, historic union 
strength, unemployment and the Ghent system are positively associated with union 
density. By contrast, trade openness, inflation, and immigration are negatively 
associated with union density. 
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Importantly, our substantive conclusions are unaffected by the addition of the 
baseline variables. When comparing the bivariate models (Models 1-4) to their 
multivariate counterparts (Model 6-9), the parameter estimates differ in only limited 
ways. In the multivariate models, the effect of capital market financialization is reduced 
by one half.  This is the largest change. But the effect of inward portfolio investment is 
reduced only slightly. Both estimates retain their statistical significance. Furthermore, 
the effect of financial sector size increases slightly and remains statistically significant 
at the p<.10 level, while the effect of corporate indebtedness becomes even smaller and 
remains insignificant. 
Table 3 provides further insights into financialization’s effect on union density.  
In Model 10, we estimate the effects of the financialization variables simultaneously. 
This allows us to gauge the effect of each financialization variable under conditions 
when the other financialization variables and control variables are held constant. 
Results from this more restrictive specification continue to support our earlier findings. 
In fact, the parameter estimates for the financialization variables are similar (cf. Model 
10 and Models 6-9). This implies that each financialization variable—except corporate 
indebtedness—exerts an independent and downward effect on union density, above 
and beyond the effects associated with the other financialization variables and the 
control variables.   
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
We now turn our attention to the relative effects of financialization. Since our 
independent variables are measured as z-scores, we can readily gauge the relative 
magnitude of our parameter estimates by direct comparison. Judging from Model 10, 
financialization is a substantively meaningful determinant of union density, especially 
if one sums together the three statistically significant financialization variables (i.e. 
stock market index, inward portfolio index, and financial sector size). However, 
financialization is not the most important factor. In absolute terms, its combined effect 
is smaller than those associated with historic union density, immigration, industrial 
employment, unemployment and the Ghent system, but similar to or greater than those 
associated with public sector size, left government seats, trade openness, and 
centralized wage bargaining. Overall, these results support our argument that 
financialization is an important but underappreciated cause of union decline.  
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Next, Model 11 checks whether our results are unduly affected by countries with 
historically prominent financial sectors. To make this determination, we re-estimate 
our model after dropping observations from Switzerland, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. Results from this reduced sample are similar to results from the full 
sample (cf. Models 10 and 11), indicating that the negative effects of financialization 
adhere beyond highly financialized countries. In fact, the effect of capital market 
financialization is higher in the reduced sample (Model 10) than in the full sample 
(Model 11). This provides additional evidence in support of our argument that 
financialization undermines unionized employment across advanced capitalism.  
Finally, we end our analysis by considering whether the effects of 
financialization vary across different forms of advanced capitalism. Recall that theories 
of comparative political economy anticipate that unions in CMEs are better positioned 
to withstand the negative effects of stock market financialization than unions in LMEs. 
This is because institutions and business practices unique to CMEs should limit the 
power of finance capital to restructure employment relations to their advantage. We 
examine this possibility by dividing our sample into two subgroups—one for LMEs 
(Model 12) and another for CMEs (Model 13)—and re-estimating our full model. 
Admittedly, this simple division between LMEs and CMEs ignores small but potentially 
meaningful institutional differences between countries and treats these differences as 
time-invariant. Indeed, although often used in empirical research, some scholars 
question this approach on these grounds (see Roberts and Kwon 2017; Streeck 2009; 
Thelen 2014). Nonetheless, we believe it suffices for our purposes, because we use the 
LME-CME distinction not as the pillar of our analysis, but more as a control variable. We 
invite readers to interpret Models 12 and 13 with the aforementioned limitations in 
mind. 
A comparison of Models 12 and 13 indicates that financialization generally 
diminishes union density in both LMEs and CMEs, but that its negative effects manifest 
unevenly and through different channels. Consistent with expectations derived from the 
comparative political economy literature, stock market financialization appears to 
undermine unionized employment more in LMEs than in CMEs. This is evidenced by the 
parameter estimate for stock market index, which is considerably larger for LMEs (b= -
.393) than for CMEs (b= -.251), and by the parameter estimate for inward portfolio index, 
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which is nearly twice as large for LMEs (b= -.418) than for CMEs (b= -204). Note that 
the statistical significance of these re-estimated parameters declines compared to the 
full sample, but this may reflect smaller sample size. Overall, results from these re-
estimated models suggest that unions in CMEs, relative to their counterparts in LMEs, 
enjoy some protection against the power of capital markets and foreign portfolio 
investors, but that negative effects manifest in both types of capitalism.  
Continuing with these two models, we find that financial sector growth puts 
downward pressure on union density primarily in CMEs. The parameter estimate for 
the CMEs sample (Model 13) is larger than the full sample (Model 10) and considerably 
larger than the LMEs sample (Model 12). For the latter, the estimated effect is close to 
zero and statistically insignificant, signifying that financial sector expansion exerts little 
downward pressure on union density in LMEs. As described in the conclusion, we 
surmise that this occurred because consumers played a prominent role in financial 
sector expansion in LMEs, but consumer-driven financialization may have less bearing 
on labor relations. By contrast, the transition from industrial to financialized capitalism 
in CMEs occurred later and more abruptly and relied more on firms than consumers, 
potentially causing problems for unionized workers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Drawing on a range of social science literatures, this study is among the first 
to examine the impact of financialization on union density using panel data. Examining 
18 advanced capitalist countries over more than four decades, we compare growth in 
four aspects of financialization to observed trends in union density. We find that 
financialization operates through several channels and contributes to union decline 
across our whole sample, but that the specific effects vary between liberal and 
coordinated forms of advanced capitalism. In particular, we link deunionization to the 
growing power and scope of capital markets in LMEs, but find this factor has more 
limited effects in CMEs. Yet, for this latter form of capitalism, financial sector expansion 
seems relatively more important. Certainly, these findings underscore how the 
institutional composition of national economies may shape and deflect some of the 
broader impacts of financialization, but they also begin to challenge core elements of 
the varieties of capitalism framework, insofar as they demonstrate that the negative 
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effects of financialization hold across countries and across the different models of 
capitalism (c.f. Jackson, Höpner, and Kurdelbusch 2006).  
 Indeed, our results suggest that financialization, as a general phenomenon, 
functions in ways that liberalize labor market institutions and eliminate unionized 
workers. This happens, we contend, because financialization pressures firms to reduce 
their payrolls, especially high-paid unionized workers, and because it reshapes the 
capital accumulation process in ways that redirect economic activity away from 
productive investment and unionized workforces. Although the particular mechanisms 
vary across types of capitalism, we observe a general tendency for financialization to 
reduce unionization and undermine the ability of workers to bargain collectively. This, 
of course, has pronounced implications for our understanding of labor relations, 
inequality, and social mobility. It also speaks to sociological thinking about institutional 
change. In this way, our work dovetails with recent literature on liberalization and the 
impacts of finance and neoliberalism on inequality and labor markets (see, e.g., Durand 
2017; Dumenil and Levy 2011; Godechot 2016; Streeck 2009, 2014; Thelen 2014). 
 We anticipated most but not all of our findings. One unexpected finding relates 
to corporate indebtedness and its impact on union density. Here we anticipated that 
increased corporate indebtedness lowers union density by pressuring firms to 
restructure labor relations in ways that free resources for debt repayment and uses 
unrelated to unionized work. However, our regression models provide little support for 
this idea. Clearly, in some instances, firms use debt in ways that sustain and expand 
business operations, potentially helping to support unionization. Yet other uses, such as 
leveraged buyouts, should generate the negative effects on unionization we anticipated. 
Unfortunately, our corporate indebtedness data cannot make such distinctions 
regarding the end use of debt, and our FD regression models capture annual changes in 
debt, but not total levels of debt. Regarding the latter point, perhaps the overall levels 
of debt, rather than incremental increases, exert influence over labor relations, but we 
miss this outcome due to our FD regression models. Clearly, this merits further 
research.  
 Another unexpected finding relates to financial sector expansion. Here we 
theorized that financial sector expansion generally shifts investment and economic 
activity away from uses that traditionally support unionized employment, but we only 
find evidence of this occurring in CMEs. Regrettably, we lack a thorough explanation for 
this anomaly, but two possible explanations seem promising. First, consumers in LMEs 
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played a pivotal role in financial sector expansion through their purchase of mortgages, 
home equity loans, student loans, credits cards, mutual funds, and other financial 
services (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). While this clearly affects household 
indebtedness, it may not exert influence over labor relations. By contrast, non-financial 
firms in CMEs played a leading role in financial sector expansion through their increased 
use of financial services (Van Treeck 2009). Quite conceivably, this type of financial 
sector expansion should affect unionization in the ways we predicted and the regression 
results confirmed.  
 Second, there is an issue of timing. LMEs have always had relatively larger 
financial sectors than CMEs, but this distinction began to change in the 1990s and 2000s 
with the advent of the Euro and new stability and growth pacts, both of which prompted 
financial sector expansion in many European countries (Durand 2017; Lapavitsas 
2014). In this way, financial sector expansion was more abrupt and possibly more 
disruptive to unionization in CMEs than LMEs. Clearly, more research is needed on this 
issue, but the aforementioned ideas offer potential starting points.  
 Similarly, future research may wish to address other aspects of financialization. 
Although the topic is well studied (e.g. Epstein 2015), much of the financialization 
literature focuses on the United States or contrasts the US experience with the 
supposedly less-financialized capitalism of Western Europe. Much of this work 
conceptualizes financialization as a single process, but along with other scholars, we 
contend that it operates through a number of distinct but interrelated channels (see 
Durand 2017; Lapavitsas 2014). Our study constructs four distinct measures of 
financialization, but further research may wish to examine other possible forms of 
financialization or develop more detailed analyses of the dimensions examined here.  
 Lastly, the relationship between financialization and globalization should be 
explored further. Several studies note that financialization, outsourcing, and global 
production networks are interconnected (Coe and Wai-Chung Yeung 2015; Durand 
2017; Milberg and Winkler 2013). In this vein, we conceptualized the globalization of 
financial markets and financialization more generally as overlapping phenomena. But 
more theoretical and empirical research is required to untangle this complex 




1. Data on private sector union density are available from Visser (2015), but 
significantly limited for our sample. Thus, we use the standard measure of union 
density, but control for public sector size to offset the inclusion of public sector workers.      
 
2. We draw on four series from the Penn World Table. Public sector size is “csh_g” 
(government’s share of national consumption). Trade openness is the sum of “csh_m” 
(imports’ share of national consumption) plus “csh_x” (exports’ share of national 
consumption) divided by “cgdpe” (expenditure side GDP). 
 
3. We use Stata’s xtunitroot ips command to assess the null hypothesis that the various 
series contain a unit-root (i.e. are non-stationary). Results suggest that our dependent 
variable, the financialization variables, and most control variables are non-stationary in 
levels.  
 
4. We conduct three post-estimation tests on Model 10. (1) A Wooldridge test, 
performed with the xtserial command, assesses a null hypothesis that the errors do not 
exhibit first-order serial correlation. The results (prob > F = 0.000) suggests the likely 
presence of serial correlation. (2) A modified version of the Breusch-Pagan test, 
performed with the xttest2 command, assesses a null hypothesis that the errors are 
independent across countries. The results (prob > χ2 = 0.000) suggest the presence of 
contemporaneously correlated errors. (3) A modified version of the Wald test, 
performed with the xttest3 command, assesses a null hypothesis that the errors have a 
common variance across panels. This null hypothesis is rejected (prob > χ2 = 0.000). 
 
5. We estimate our models with the following Stata command: xtpcse d.(dependent 
variable, independent variable list), correlation(psar1). The “d.” implements first 
differencing.  
 
6. We identify “annual trading activity” as a possible instrument for “stock market 
capitalization,” but find both variables are correlated with union density. For this 
reason, we combine them into a single index.  
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7. We use Roodman’s (2006) “xtabond2” command and experiment with ways to 
overcome the “too many instruments” problem (Roodman 2009). First, following 
Roodman (2006), we reduce the number of GMM-style instruments by collapsing the 
matrix of instruments into a single column and by limiting the number of lags used as 
instruments. However, our instrumented variables remain over-identified (i.e. Sargan 
test p-value = .000). Second, we drastically reduce the temporal dimension of our panel 
data by limiting observations to once every five years (i.e. 1970, 1975, 1980…2010). 
This helps but insufficiently ameliorates the problem (i.e. Sargan test p-value = .110).  
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Table 1.  Bivariate Models of Financialization on Union Density  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financialization variables     




   





  Financial sector size  
 
  -.136 ϯ 
(.083) 
 
  Corporate indebtedness  
 
   -.122 
(.283) 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 
Number of observations 627 658 703 681 
R-squared .047 .031 .019 .007 
Note:  All variables are first differenced.  Independent variables measured as z-scores.  
Estimation by Prais-Winsten regression. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.  




Table 2. Multivariate Regression Models of Financialization on Union Density  
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Baseline model      




















































































































      
Financialization variables      




   
  Inward portfolio index (t-1) 
 
  -.560*** 
(.161) 
  
  Financial sector size  
 
   -.201 ϯ 
(.115) 
 
  Corporate indebtedness  
 
    -.008 
(.009) 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
Number of observations 723 583 658 684 609 
R-squared .143 .211 .174 .153 .150 
Note:  All variables are first differenced.  Independent variables measured as z-scores.  
Estimation by Prais-Winsten regression. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. 









Table 3. Full Regression Model of Financialization on Union Density: Whole  













Baseline model     






























































































     
Financialization variables     








































Number of countries 18 15 6 12 
Number of observations 536 458 157 360 
R-squared .232 .230 .377 .196 
Note:  All variables are first differenced.  Independent variables measured as z-scores.  
Estimation by Prais-Winsten regression. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
Model 10 excludes Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US). 
Model 11 includes LMEs only. 
Model 12 includes CMEs only. 
ϯ = p< .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.   
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Table A1.  Regression Estimates of Individual Indicators of Financialization as  
Determinants of Union Density (Controls Included but Not Reported) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stock Market Index      




   -.227* 
(.105) 
     Stock market trading activity  -.231** 
(.076) 
  -.229* 
(.092) 
Portfolio Index      
    Inward portfolio investment   
 









All control variables included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
Number of observations 597 561 684 670 527 
R-squared .225 .211 .150 .164 .241 
Note:  All variables are first differenced. Independent variables measured as z-scores.  
Estimation by Prais-Winsten regression. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.  






Table A2.  Error Correction Model: Regression Estimates of Financialization as a 
Determinant of Union Density (Controls Included but Not Reported) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




   -.227* 
(.105) 
Stock market index  t-1   -.156** 
(.051) 
   -.101 ϯ 
(.049) 




  -.150 
(.199) 
Inward portfolio index  t-1   -.026 
(.064) 
  -.154 ϯ 
(.082) 




Financial sector size t-1 
 








Corporate indebtedness t-1 
 




      
Fixed effect dummies 
included? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All control variables included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
Number of observations 583 694 684 609 544 
R-squared .358 .339 .336 .333 .347 
Note:  Control variables from the baseline model included but not reported. Estimation by 
Prais-Winsten regression.  Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors.   
ϯ = p< .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.   
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